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To Begin the Nation Anew:

Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights
after the Civil War

ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI

IN 1857, THE HIGHEST COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HELD THAT BLACKS in America

possessed no rights, could never become citizens of the United States, and that
Congress was powerless to abolish slavery.' In the aftermath of these pronouncements, this country fought one of the bloodiest wars in its history. Fewer than ten
years after the Dred Scott decision, however, Congress and the Northern states

accomplished precisely what the Supreme Court declared could not be done,
through constitutional amendments and a civil rights statute. The Thirteenth
Amendment abolished slavery everywhere in the United States. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship on and secured

the civil rights of all qualified, natural-born, and naturalized Americans, including
former slaves and free blacks. The statute declared illegal infringements of certain
civil rights made under the prextext of law or custom and authorized the removal
of civil and criminal cases from the state to the federal courts whenever Americans
were unable to enforce their rights in the state systems ofjustice. The Fourteenth

Amendment also expressly prohibited the states from infringing the rights that
Americans enjoyed as citizens of the United States and their rights to due process

and equal protection of the law.
The meaning and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 have been almost as controversial among twentieth-

century scholars as they were among the participants in Reconstruction. In 1947,
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black sparked a debate over the scope of a national
authority to enforce civil rights when he held that the Fourteenth Amendment
conferred on the national government the power to protect the Bill of Rights

against state infringements.2 Charles Fairman quickly wrote a rebuttal, in which
he insisted that the congressional framers intended to secure only an equality in

state law among the few rights enumerated in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, a
view he continued to maintain. William Crosskey published a rejoinder to Fairman,
I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Eric Foner, Kermit Hall, Paul Murphy, William Nelson,
George Rappaport, David Reiser, and the participants of the New York University School of Law
Colloquium in Legal History.

1 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 404 (1857).
2 Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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in which Crosskey asserted his view of a nation-centered federalism that delegated

to Congress the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights, a view he later elaborated
in his three-volume history of the U.S. Constitution.3 The specific question

whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights has
been vigorously debated, most recently by Raoul Berger and Michael Curtis.4
Other legal scholars and historians have focused on additional aspects of a
national civil rights enforcement authority. Jacobus tenBroek and Howard Jay

Graham argued that the theory of the Reconstruction amendments derived from
the natural rights ideology of the abolitionists, and that the amendments delegated

to Congress an expansive authority to enforce fundamental rights.5 They assumed
that it was the Radicals who controlled Congress during Reconstruction and
incorporated their expansive view into the Reconstruction amendments. Revi-

sionist historians in the 1960s argued that the moderate Republicans, not the
Radicals, controlled Congress and formulated Reconstruction policy.6
Although revisionist political historians of the 1 960s agreed that even moderate
Republicans were committed to securing civil rights after the Civil War, revisionist

legal historians in the 1970s argued that the Reconstruction amendments did not
significantly alter American federal constitutionalism. Insisting that the moderates
were legal conservatives who consciously intended to avoid a revolutionary
restructuring of constitutional law and to retain a federalism based on states' rights,

the revisionists concluded that the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment preserved in the states primary authority over citizenship and civil rights.
The states therefore continued to enjoy the authority to determine the status of

Americans, define their rights, and provide for their protection. The framers of
the legislation intended that citizens redress violations of civil rights and enforce
their rights through state courts and law enforcement agencies. Conscious of the
revolutionary implications for American federalism, the framers conferred on the

national government merely the authority to prohibit the states from discrimi3 Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding," Stanford Law Review, 2 (1949): 5; Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88 (Part One), vol. 6 of History of the Supreme Court of the United States, P. Freund, ed. (NeW York,
1971), see especially chaps. 19 and 21; William Crosskey, "Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History' and
the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority," University of Chicago Law Review, 22 (1954): 1; see
also Charles Fairman, "A Reply to Professor Crosskey," p. 144; William Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States, 3 vols. (1953, 1980), especially chaps. 30-32.
4 For the recent debate, see Raoul Berger, Government byJudiciary: The Transformation of theFourteenth
Amendment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Michael Curtis, "The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State
Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger," Wake Forest Law Review, 16 (1980): 45; Michael Curtis, "The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights," ConnecticutLaw Review, 44 (1982): 237; Michael Curtis,
No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Durham, N.C., 1986); Raoul
Berger, "Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat," Ohio
State Law Journal, 42 (1981): 435; and Raoul Berger, "Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to
Michael Curtis' Response," Ohio State Law Journal, 44 (1983): 1.
5Jacobus tenBroek, Equal under Law (New York, 1965); Howard Jay Graham, "The Early
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment," Wisconsin Law Review (1950): 479; and
Howard Jay Graham, "Our Declaratory Fourteenth Amendment," Stanford Law Review, 7 (1954): 3.

6 See Eric McKitrick, AndrewJohnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1960); William Brock, An Americ
Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1864-1867 (New York, 1963); and La Wanda Cox and John Cox,
Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866 (New York, 1963).
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To Begin the Nation Anew 47
nating among citizens on the basis of race in matters relating to civil rights and to
punish state officers who did so.7

CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS BELIEVED THAT THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 represented a revolutionary change
in American constitutionalism.8 A change in federalism was a prerequisite for

Congress to legislate for the protection of civil rights, in light of the nineteenthcentury concept of federalism. If the status and fundamental rights of citizenship

were the rights that individuals enjoyed as citizens of the states, Congress would
not have had the authority to legislate for their protection. These fundamental
rights would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. The proposal by
Congress of a constitutional amendment and a statute that conferred on all

Americans the precious status of citizen, enumerated some of the fundamental
rights of citizenship, and extended to citizens federally enforceable guarantees for

the protection of their civil rights was itself a revolutionary change in American
federalism.
The radical change in American constitutionalism represented by the actions of

Congress forced congressional Republicans to formulate a legal theory delegating
to Congress the authority to secure the status and civil rights of Americans.
Republicans explained that sovereignty resided in the national government and
included the primary authority to determine the status and secure the rights of all
Americans, white as well as black.9 They interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment
7 See Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, 1228-29; Berger, Government by Judiciary;
Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution
(New York, 1973), especially pp. 457, 460-68; Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle:
Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction (New York, 1974), 27, 41, 48, 56-69, 122-26, 147-49, 170;
Michael Les Benedict, "Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruc-

tion,"Journal of American History, 61 (1974): 65; Phillip Paludan, A Covenant with Death: The Co
Law, and Equality in the Civil War Era (Urbana, Ill., 1975), 58, 261, 274-75; Herman Belz, Emancipation
and Equal Rights: Politics and Constitutionalism in the Civil War Era (New York, 1978), 108-40; and
Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen's Rights, 1861-1866 (New York,

1976), 157-77.
8 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of
Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 (New York, 1985), and "Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction," New York University Law Review, 61 (1986), forthcoming. The
essential conceptual framework and conclusions of this study relating to the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866 were originally presented in Robert J.
Kaczorowski, "The Nationalization of Civil Rights: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a Racist
Society, 1866-1883 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971); "Race, Law and Politics:
Congress and Civil Rights after the Civil War," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern
Historical Association, November, 1973; and "Civil Rights in the Lower Federal and State Courts
during Reconstruction," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, April, 1975. See also Harold Hyman and William Wiecek, Equal Justice under the Law:
Constitutional Development, 1835 to 1875 (New York, 1982), 386-438; Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights,
108-40; and Belz, A New Birth of Freedom, 157-77.
9 For example, the "father" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cong. John A. Bingham of Ohio, in
a statement that represented the views of his congressional colleagues, declared that the authority to
secure the rights of citizens "belongs to every sovereign power, and is essentially a subject of national

jurisdiction." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1090. This view of national sovereignty
was also expressed outside of Congress. See the letter of "Madison" published in the New York Times
(November 15, 1866): 2. Other scholars have noted this interpretation, but they reached different
conclusions concerning the scope of authority the amendment delegated to Congress. See Belz,
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as a constitutional guarantee of the status of Americans as free people and

therefore as a delegation of authority to Congress to secure the fundamental rights
of American citizens. Congressional Republicans reasoned that the amendment,
in abolishing slavery, secured liberty and the rights of free people. They equated
the status and rights of free people with the status and natural rights of citizens.
Congressional Republicans understood the Thirteenth Amendment as a guaran-

tee of the status and rights of citizenship. Applying a Hamiltonian, nationalistic
interpretation of the Constitution, which attributed to Congress the authority to

secure rights that are recognized or guaranteed by the Constitution, they
concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment delegated to Congress the authority

to prohibit slavery and, more important, the authority to secure inherent rights
of all U.S. citizens against violation from any source in whatever manner Congress

deemed appropriate. IO Thus, James F. Wilson, the representative from Iowa and
the House floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill, introduced it with the explanation

"that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication

the power in Congress to protect them."1'
Republicans expressed in law their understanding of the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment when they enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth

Amendment. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act confers citizenship on all qualified
American inhabitants and guarantees to all American citizens at least some of the
rights the framers believed to be fundamental. 12 They added a similar citizenship

clause to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment in the event that a

subsequent Congress repealed the Civil Rights Act. The addition of this clause was
also designed to prevent courts from declaring the statute unconstitutional by

Emancipation and Equal Rights, 108-40; Daniel Farber and John Meunch, "The Ideological Origins of

the Fourteenth Amendment," Constitutional Commentary, 1 (1984): 235, 262-63.

" The framers believed that the Congress possessed plenary authority over civil rights, as established
by the following: Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 41-42 (Sen. Sherman); pp. 43,

474, 476, 527-28, 573-74, 600, 1758, 1780-81 (Sen. Trumbull); pp. 503-04 (Sen. Howard); p. 570
(Sen. Morrill); pp. 602, 741 (Sen. Lane of Indiana); p. 703 (Sen. Fessendon); p. 768 (Sen. Johnson);
pp. 571, 3031-32 (Sen. Henderson); p. 1225 (Sen. Wilson); pp. 1255, 1780, 3037, Appendix 101 (Sen.

Yates); Appendix 96 (Sen. Williams); pp. 1033, 1088-94, 1291, 2542 (Cong. Bingham); pp. 1115,
1118-19, 1294-95 (Cong. Wilson); p. I 120 (Cong. Rogers); p. I 124 (Cong. Cook); pp. I 151-53 (C(ong.
Thayer); p. 1262 (Cong. Broomall); p. 1266 (Cong. Raymond); p. 1295 (Cong. Latham); and pp. 1832,
1836 (Cong. Lawrence). This understanding of a congressional civil rights enforcement authority was

expressed outside of Congress as well. See the New York Tribune (February 3,1866): 6; Chicago Tribune
(February 4, 1866): 2; New York Times (January 16, 1866): 4; (February 8, 1866): 4; (March 31, 1866):
4; Baltimore American (March 23, 1866), clipping in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward
McPherson, ed., Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, container 99, p. 4; and various
undated clippings in the Scrapbook from the New York Sun, p. 15; Pittsburgh Gazette, p. 40; Cincinnati

Gazette, pp. 40, 54: Syracuse journal, p. 53; Cleveland Herald, p. 54; and the Chicago Post, p. 58, among
others.

" Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1118-19. I established that this was also the
understanding of U.S. judges and attorneys in Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1-12, 27-48.
12 Section I provides that such citizens "shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
pur-chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,

regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding"; 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment as a mere abrogation of slavery.'3 The
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes explicit the constitutional
recognition of the status and natural rights of citizens that its framers believed was

implied in the Thirteenth Amendment. The ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 thus completed the constitutional revolution regarding
citizenship and civil rights. Congressional Republicans legislated to secure the civil
rights of Americans in 1866 with the understanding that, with the Thirteenth and

then the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution of the United States gave to

all Americans the fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated to Congress the
authority to protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights.14
A striking feature of the framers' intent in 1866 is their adoption of the most
radical abolitionist theory of constitutionalism before the Civil War. 15 By 1866, not

only radicals but all moderate and even some conservative Republicans supported
the efforts of Congress to secure civil rights. 16 This shift reveals the extent to which
the Civil War radicalized American politics. A political and constitutional position

regarded as extreme and embraced by a very small minority before the Civil War
had become mainstream Republicanism by 1866. The position that contemporaries regarded as radical in 1866 was securing the voting rights of blacks. As a
matter of law and as a matter of political objectives, most contemporaries

distinguished between civil rights and voting rights.'7 The essential reason that
Radical Republicans criticized the Fourteenth Amendment as too moderate was
its failure to provide the same protection for voting rights as for civil rights.18
The full reach of this revolution in constitutionalism could have changed the
nature of American government from a federal republic with divided authority
to a unitary state. Democratic opponents in Congress recognized the implications

of the Republicans' theory of constitutionalism. Democrats objected to the

proposed Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Bill precisely because the
13 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1291-92 (Cong. Bingham); and p. 2896 (Sen.
Howard).

14 Supporters of civil rights enforcement insisted that U.S. citizenship, and not state citizenship,
entitled Americans to all of the fundamental rights of citizenship and the enjoyment of these rights.
See the debates among Senators Van Winkle, Cowan, Trumbull, Johnson, Davis, and Clark in
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 497-500, 506, 523-30, 600, 1777-81, and Appendix
182. Opponents of congressional civil rights enforcement denied that Congress possessed the authority
to determine the status and guarantee the rights of citizens within the states. Congressional Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1156 (Cong. Thornton); p. 1268 (Cong. Kerr); p. 1679 (Pres. Johnson's veto
of the Civil Rights Bill); and pp. 1775-80 (Sen. Johnson). For a fuller discussion of these points, see
Kaczorowski, "Revolutionary Constitutionalism."
15 For a good analysis of antebellum abolitionist theories of constitutionalism and slavery, see William

Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977). See also
tenBroek, Equal under Law; and Graham, "Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment."

16 See Benedict, A Compromise of Principle; Cox and Cox, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice.
17 Good discussions of the political aspects of the suffrage issue are in La Wanda Cox andJohn
"Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography,"Journal of Social History, 33 (1967): 303; William Gillette, The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage
oftheFifteenthAmendment (Baltimore, Md., 1965). For representative comments in Congress on the issue
of black suffrage, see Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 476, 599 (Sen. Trumbull). For
representative press commentary, see The Nation, 2 (April 26, 1866): 518; and the Chicago Tribune
(February 5, 1866): 4.

18 See Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 673, 675, 684 (Sen. Sumner); and
Kaczorowski, "Nationalization of Civil Rights."
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constitutional theory that these measures encompassed could be used by Congress

to destroy the civil and criminal authority of states over their citizens. If, as
proponents of civil rights insisted, the Constitution guaranteed the fundamental
rights of citizenship, Congress could exercise exclusivejurisdiction over civil rights.
National law could supplant state law and the national government could absorb

"all reserved state sovereignty and rights."'9 Senator Garret Davis, Democrat from
Kentucky, was one of several opponents who objected that "the principles involved
in this bill, if they are legitimate and constitutional, would authorize Congress to

pass civil and criminal codes for every State of the Union."20 These views were

echoed by the House of Representatives, the White House, and the press.21
These positions were a continuation of a constitutional battle that had raged for
many years. Before the Civil War, the states had defined the status and secured
the rights of the inhabitants of the United States. They performed these functions

through state legal institutions, statutes, and courts. Some antebellum legal
theorists argued, however, that the primary authority to perform these functions
rested with the national government.22 The question of whether the national or
state governments possessed ultimate authority to determine the status and

enforce the rights of American inhabitants produced a national political and
constitutional debate that centered on slavery and culminated in the South's
secession in 1861. Secession, based on the constitutional theory of state sover-

eignty, made the legal questions of federalism and the locus of sovereignty central

issues of the Civil War. The North responded with Abraham Lincoln's theory of
national sovereignty, which denied the existence of any state's right to secede.23
The Emancipation Proclamation added the other central question, namely, which
government possessed the primary constitutional authority to determine the status
of American inhabitants.
The antebellum constitutional questions of the nature of American federalism,

the locus of sovereignty, and the primary authority over the status of Americans
were thus joined as political issues in the Civil War. The causes of Unionism,
national sovereignty, and emancipation were victorious on the battlefield. North19 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, Appendix 185, pp. 156-58 (Sen. Davis).

20 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1414.
21 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1120, 1122, 2538 (Cong. Rogers); p. 1154

(Cong. Eldridge); p. 1156 (Cong. Thornton); p. 1266 (Cong. Raymond); pp. 1268, 1270-71 (Cong.
Kerr); p. 1295 (Cong. Latham); pp. 1679-81 (Pres. Johnson's veto); ex-Governor William Sharkey to
Mississippi Governor Benjamin Humphreys, 17 September 1866, reprinted in unidentified newspaper,
clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
Congress, container 100, p. 23; resolution of the Texas legislature rejecting ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in the New York Times (November 4, 1866): 2; resolution of the
Kansas Senate Committee on the Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in the Memphis Avalanche, n.d.,

clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, p. 55.

John Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1858, 1862); James
Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978); and Wiecek,
Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism.
23 These conflicting constitutional theories were expressed in the Southern state resolutions relating
to secession and in President Lincoln's messages to Congress. "Mississippi Resolution on Secession,"

in Documents in American History, Henry Commager, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1973), 373; "South
Carolina Declaration of Causes of Secession," p. 372; "PresidentJ. Davis, Message to Congress," p. 389;
Abraham Lincoln, "Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861," p. 393.
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ern Republicans believed that the Civil War had resolved these political and
constitutional questions. They soon discovered they were mistaken.24 Former
Confederates tenaciously adhered to a philosophy of state sovereignty and refused
to respect national authority. They defiantly resisted the emancipation guaranteed

blacks by the Thirteenth Amendment. Southern white suprernacists denied the
freedmen's freedom by continuing to treat them as if they were slaves. White

supremacists frequently met the attempts of freed blacks to assert their constitutionally guaranteed freedom with violent repression and economic intimidation.
Moreover, they treated white Unionists and federal officers with disrespect, and
resorted to economic intimidation and violence toward them as well.25

Local officials in the South sanctioned and legitimized the defiant behavior of
individuals and the racial and political customs of communities dominated by

whites. In their constitutions and laws, Southern states refused to recognize that

blacks were citizens possessing the natural rights of free people.26 State officers
commonly failed or refused to protect the personal safety and property of blacks.
They similarly refused to extend this protection to whites who were political allies
or federal agents of blacks. When Southern blacks and politically unpopular whites
were the victims of crimes, they could not get sheriffs to arrest, courts to try, or
juries to convict the perpetrators. When charged with crimes or sued in the civil
courts, blacks seldom received impartialjustice. Indeed, white Unionists and freed
blacks were prosecuted and sent to prison during peacetime for aiding the U.S.
forces during the war. Southern hostility persuaded Northern Republicans and
Southern Unionists that secessionist and Confederate sentiments had survived the

Civil War.27 By the end of 1865, the constitutional and political process of restoring
the Southern states to the Union had become the problem of preserving the
principles for which the war had been fought.

24 According to Eric McKitrick, Southern recalcitrance immediately after Appomattox was perceiv
by Northern Republicans as endangering the fruits of the Union victory. The refusal of many former

Confederates to accept defeat necessitated the measures of Reconstruction, in the minds of North
Republicans. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 21-41.

25 Michael Perman, Reunion without Compromise: The South andReconstruction, 1865-1868 (Cambridg
1973); Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York, 1979). Congressional
Republicans received reports of these conditions while they were framing the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Grant Goodrich to Lyman Trumbull, 1 February 1866, Lyman
Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; Brigadier General J. W. Sprague to John Sherman, 4 April
1866, John Sherman Papers; George A. Custer to Zachariah Chandler, 14 January 1866, Zachariah
Chandler Papers, Library of Congress. These reports were confirmed by Congress's own investigations.
See Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Report, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866; Freedmen's Affairs, 39th
Cong., Ist sess., Senate Exec. Doc. 66 (1866); and Murder of Union Soldiers, 39th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept.
23 (1866).
26 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 27-44; Niemen, To Set the Law in Motion; James
Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, La., 1967); Theodore
Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1965).
27 The conclusion that Southerners abused white Unionists and freed blacks and that observers
interpreted this abuse as hostility toward and resistance to federal authority was expressed in letters
to congressional Republicans, such as those cited in note 24 above and the following: William Ware
Peck to Charles Sumner, 1 January 1866, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard

University; and George W. Kingsbury to Justin S. Morrill, 18 June 1866, Justin S. Morrill Papers,
Library of Congress.
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THE CIVIL WAR HAD BEEN A UNIQUELY PARTISAN WAR. Republicans stood for Union

and emancipation; Democrats were associated with leniency toward Confederate
secessionists and slavery. When President Andrew Johnson attempted a quick
restoration of the Confederate states after the war, Democrats rallied behind him.

Restoration by the president presented insuperable political problems, however.
It preserved the political leadership of the same individuals and groups that had
led the Southern states into secession and civil war.28 If Republicans acquiesced in

Johnson's plan, their Democratic opponents would gain ascendancy by joining
with the late belligerents of the South, an outcome unacceptable to Northern
Republicans. It would condone "traitorism" and betray their Unionist allies in the
South. But achievement of Republican political objectives in the South, which
included a political power base of white Unionists and free blacks, would require

a change in Southern political leadership. Political participation of the Republicans' Southern allies necessitated a federal presence to protect them from the
hostility of the dominant Democratic Conservative white supremacists. As the Civil
War was a partisan effort associated with and led by the Republican party, so
Reconstruction was a partisan postwar readjustment controlled by and identified
with Northern Republicans.
In 1866, the political context of civil rights deprivations compelled Congress to
take effective measures to secure the fundamental rights of American citizens.
Although Republicans shrank from providing freed blacks with economic inde-

pendence through land redistribution, they did offer legal recognition of their
liberty by securing important rights for their economic autonomy, such as the
rights to enter into contracts and to buy and sell property. Congressional

Republicans put aside racial prejudice that ordinarily would have precluded the
legal enforcement of civil rights.29 The factors motivating them included the

perceived need to preserve the objectives for which so many thousands gave their
lives, the obligation to make effective the freedom they had promised to Southern

blacks, a sense of elemental fairness and justice, as well as political self-interest. All
these objectives were served by providing for the personal safety and security of
Southern political allies-civilians of both races and federal officers. The political
ideology of the Republican party further diminished the effects of Northern white
racism on congressional Republicans. The central ideas of the party were the

theory of natural rights, a classic liberalism, and a belief in equal opportunity. The
combination served as a concept of American nationalism, distinguishing Repub-

28 G. Koerner to Lyman Trumbull, 11 January 1866, Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; H. B
Allis to Benjamin F. Wade, 21 March 1866, Benjamin F. Wade Papers, Library of Congress; Joel Silbey,

A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868 (New York, 1977); Perman,
Reunion without Compromise.

29 Useful discussions of white racism and its effect on the politics of the era include George
Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny,
1817-1914 (New York, 1963); Forrest Wood, Black Scare: The Racist Response to Emancipation and
Reconstruction (Berkeley, Calif., 1970); V. Jacque Voegeli, Free But Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro
during the Civil War (Chicago, 1967); C. Vann Woodward, "Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy,"
American Philosophical Society Proceedings, 1 10 (1966): 1.
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lican notions of Unionism and American freedom from the Southern Democratic

Conservative ideology of states' rights and slavery.30
Northern Republicans decided that the preservation of American nationhood
and freedom, as they understood them, required a strong central government to

combat the danger posed by Southern recalcitrance. Republican William
Lawrence of Ohio invoked political necessity when he warned the House that the

congressional protection of civil rights was "essential to preserve national life, and

the means of national existence."3l Withholding this protection would be tantamount to permitting the Southern states to divest citizens of their rights in the
aftermath of Appomattox. The editor of the Philadelphia American echoed this
theme in urging ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: "If there be one lesson
written in bloody letters by the [Civil] War, it is that the national citizenship must

be paramount to that of the State. We propose to make it so ... This citizenship
provision is one of the most vital principles developed by the war. Without it we

shall inevitably be exposed to new wars of Secession and States rights and
nullification."32 The governor of Wisconsin, Lucius Fairchild, transmitted a copy
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the state legislature and urged

ratification "because, in view of the terrible events of the past five years, we deem

these guarantees necessary to the life of the nation, and we insist that those who
saved that life have an undeniable right to demand full guarantees to its future
preservation."33
The conjunction of political ideology and political necessity resulted in con-

gressional Republicans embracing a revolutionary theory of constitutionalism. To
achieve political power in the South, to preserve their wartime objectives of
Unionism and freedom for slaves, they insisted that sovereignty resided in the
federal government and included primary authority to determine the status and
secure the rights of all Americans, white and black. Republican supporters of the
Reconstruction amendments and the civil rights statute acknowledged the

revolutionary changes they had wrought in American federalism by delegating
plenary authority over citizenship and civil rights to the national government.34

30 For analyses of the Republican party's ideology, see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: T
Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (London, 1970); Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and
Nationalism in American Ideology (Cambridge, 1964). Examples of this Republican ideology include Sen.

Lyman Trumbull's speech in the Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 474; John Andrew
Valedictory Address of his Excellency John A. Andrews to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massachusetts,
Jan. 4, 1866 (Boston, 1866); Benjamin Butler, The Status of the Insurgent States upon Cessation of Hostilities:
Speech delivered before the Pennsylvania Legislature, Apr. 11, 1866 (Washington, D.C., 1866).

31 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., lstsess., 1866, pp. 1832, 1836. See also p. 1090 (Cong. Bingham);
pp. 1262-63 (Cong. Broomall); and Appendix 99 (Sen. Yates).

32 Clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
Congress, p. 41.

33 Unidentified newspaper in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, p. 63.
34 See Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1065-67 (Cong. Higby); p. 1066 (Cong.
Price); p. 2442 (Sen. Howard); pp. 2534-35 (Cong. Ecklay); p. 2961 (Sen. Poland). See above, notes
9,10, 11, and 31 for evidence that the framers' view of constitutionalism, as it was expressed in Congress
and discussed in the press, held that Congress possessed plenary authority to secure civil rights.
Opponents objected because they understood that Republican constitutionalism was revolutionary. See
pp. 1063-64 (Cong. Hale); pp. 1083-85 (Cong. Davis); p. 2500 (Cong. Shanklin); p. 2538 (Cong.
Rogers); p. 2987 (Sen. Cowan); and p. 3147 (Cong. Harding).
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Before the Civil War, the states had exercised almost exclusive jurisdiction over

fundamental rights. Under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as
Republicans understood them, Congress could conceivably supplant the states in
securing civil rights. By virtue of the Constitution's supremacy clause, Congress
could exercise exclusive authority over citizenship and civil rights and thereby
destroy state authority as a matter of constitutional law.35 Indeed, Congress
exercised this authority when it determined by statute and constitutional amendment which people were citizens and what rights they were to enjoy. The states
were deprived of their historical authority to make these decisions. Although
congressional Republicans acknowledged the constitutional revolution in which
they were engaged, they carefully avoided carrying this revolution to its ultimate
conclusion of creating a unitary political structure. Republicans did not wish to
supplant the states in providing a foundation for ordinary civil and criminaljustice.
On the contrary, they consciously preserved federalism by avoiding unnecessary
intrusions on state authority over civil rights. Intentionally recognizing concurrent
authority, Congress restricted its protection of fundamental rights to situations in
which states and localities failed to protect them.
The decision of congressional Republicans to preserve state authority over

ordinary civil and criminal justice has led legal historians to conclude that the

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
modest increases in national authority.36 The evidence, however, supports the
belief of the framers that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
1866 statute would bring about revolutionary changes in federal constitutionalism.
The underlying constitutional authority to enforce civil rights stemmed from the
constitutional recognition of the status and rights of free people as having the
status and rights of U.S. citizens. Because the civil rights inherent in citizenship
were constitutionally guaranteed, the framers believed that Congress, by statute
and constitutional amendment, could require the states, the traditional guardians
of these rights, to secure them for all Americans. Congress conferred citizenship

on all qualified persons in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment, the framers thereby forcing the states to recognize freed blacks as
citizens both of the United States and of the states of their residence. The states
no longer could decide state citizenship for themselves. They were prohibited from

arbitrarily excluding any qualified persons from state citizenship and from
refusing to secure the civil rights to which citizenship entitled them. By defining
natural rights as constitutionally recognized rights of American citizenship,
Republicans acknowledged that Americans possessed these rights independent of
state law. That is, if the states were to repeal their legal recognition of these rights,

citizens could still claim them as constitutionally recognized and secured rights of
35 This exclusive authority was precisely one of the consequences of Republican constitutionalism
to which opponents adamantly objected. A modern example of the use of the supremacy clause is the
exercise by Congress of exclusive authority over interstate commerce, known as the preemption
doctrine. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).

36 These historians are cited in note 7.
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American citizenship. Indeed, James F. Wilson of Iowa made this precise point in
arguing that the bill was needed because the Southern states failed to recognize
and secure the rights of certain Americans. Congress had to provide this protection
and had the power to do so independent of the states.37

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE FRAMERS' UNDERSTANDING of civil rights enforcement

were evidently vague and ambiguous. Determining from the language of the law
the specific civil rights that individuals possessed as citizens was problematical.
President Lincoln's attorney general, Edward Bates, in an official opinion,

discussed the ambiguous definition of the rights of citizens as "generic, common,
embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed."38 The framers acknowledged the
legal uncertainty, yet they were unequivocal in declaring that the natural rights to
life, liberty, and property, and rights incidental to these, were the rights of U.S.

citizenship that they intended to secure with the Civil Rights Act and the

Fourteenth Amendment.39 The representative from Ohio, William Lawrence,
explained the Republican legal theory of civil rights enforcement and the generic
nature of the rights of citizens that Republicans were attempting to guarantee: "It

is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to
labor, whereby alone he can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a

right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege
and the rewards of labor. . . Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live,
the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute
rights, there are others, such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to

purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security
of person and property."40

This Republican theory of citizenship and congressionally enforceable civil
rights led to two important legal consequences. In defining civil rights and the
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens as the natural rights of free people, the
framers provided legal recognition of the civil rights of citizens independent of

state law. In addition, the framers established an expansive body of nationally
enforceable civil rights. Wilson explained that "there is no right enumerated in the

Constitution by general terms or by specific designation which is not definitely

embodied in one of the rights I have mentioned, or results as an incident necessary

to complete defense and enjoyment of the specific right."4' The framers created
the potential for a future Congress or the courts to enforce rights that were not
specified in the Civil Rights Act, or that, in 1866, may not have been regarded as
incident to the natural rights to life, liberty, and property encompassed within the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
37 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1117-18.
38 E. Bates, "Citizenship," Official Opinions of the Attorneys General, 10 (1866): 383, 407.
39 Cong. Shellabarger complained, "It has been found impossible to settle or define what are all the
indispensable rights of American citizenship." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1293.

40 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1756.
"' Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 1118-19.
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Although the enactments of 1866 were radical, the framers' concept of a
national authority to enforce civil rights was developmental and expansionary. It

permitted civil rights protection beyond that provided in 1866. Congress subse-

quently attempted to enforce additional rights more directly. In 1870 and 1871,
for instance, Congress passed laws that protected political participation and

political expression by criminalizing certain conspiracies intended to prevent

people from enforcing their rights of U.S. citizenship. In 1875, Congress legislated
to desegregate places of public accommodations.42 Judges reflected this developmental aspect of Republican constitutionalism in interpreting the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment as securing rights not enumerated in the

statute's first section. Federal judges applied the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
segregated public facilities and common carriers and held the proprietors liable
under the first and second sections of the statute for infringing the rights of citizens

to equal access. Courts sometimes ordered court officers to allow blacks on juries,
even though the Act did not explicitly guarantee the right to serve or the
defendant's right to racially integrated juries. Federal judges interpreted the
privileges and immunities of citizenship secured by the Fourteenth Amendment

as including the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly.43
The framers drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to describe some of the civil

rights to which U.S. citizenship entitled citizens, that is, civil rights that the framers

believed incidental to the generic rights of life, liberty, and property. Section 1
declares that U.S. citizens "of every race and color . . . shall have the same right

... as is enjoyed by white citizens."44 This language appears to confer on citizens
only a right to racial equality and not the substantive rights per se. In wording

Section 1 as they did, however, the framers sought to secure these rights of
citizenship in two ways: by requiring the states to impartially protect the personal
rights and safety of all persons through systems of civil and criminal justice, and
by providing a cause of action for those unable to enjoy rights as white citizens

enjoyed them.
The framers permitted the states to decide for themselves the conditions under

which civil rights were to be exercised and enjoyed, as long as the conditions were
reasonable. Congress permitted the states to vary the enjoyment of civil rights

according to age, sex, mental capacity, and alienage, since such discriminations

were considered reasonable and necessary.45 Although Republicans envisioned a

42 16 Stat. 140 (1870); 17 Stat. 13 (1871); 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
43 See Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, pp.
108-11, 119-20, 133-34, 136; and Scrapbook, John Underwood, ed., John C. Underwood Papers,

Library of Congress, pp. 193, 203, 205, 207. See the New York Times (May 8,1867): 1; (August 9,1867):
4; (August 30, 1867): 5; (October 17, 1867): 1; (October 20, 1867): 1. See also Slaughterhouse Cases, 15
F. Cas. 649,652-53 (C.C. La. 1870) (no. 8408); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C. La. 1871)
(no. 15,282); United States zv. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1328, 1329 (C.C. Del. 1873) (no. 15,211). For a contrary
view, see Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion, 139.

44 Section 1 specifies "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States"; 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
45 The Neuw York Evening Post commented that the Civil Rights Act declared who were citizens and
what rights they had. Yet the Post also insisted that the statute did not "usurp the power of the local
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national uniformity in the rights that citizens possessed as citizens, they also
provided for local variations in the ways in which citizens exercised these rights.

The framers thus preserved a federal constitutional structure of government that

distributed authority over fundamental rights to both the national and state
governments but delegated ultimate authority to the national government.

Judges understood the Republican legal theory of civil rights enforcement
authority that underlay the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be a blend of concurrent
authority and exclusive national authority. Although the fundamental rights of

citizenship, such as those specified in the Civil Rights Act, were secured to all
citizens under national law, and the states could not deny these rights to any citizen,
the states were still permitted to determine the conditions under which these civil
rights were to be exercised, so long as state law did not conflict with national law
or until Congress exercised the authority to prescribe these conditions. In 1867,
Justice Noah H. Swayne clarified the scope of this theory, deciding that the
Kentucky rules of evidence violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866. These rules
recognized the right of blacks to testify in Kentucky state courts, but only if no
white witnesses were available. Observing that the Thirteenth Amendment

'reversed and annulled the original policy of the constitution" by guaran
all Americans the status and rights of free people and delegating to Congress the
authority to secure the status and rights of citizenship, Justice Swayne held that

the Civil Rights Act guaranteed black witnesses the right to testify under the same

conditions white witnesses did.46 On the other hand, the California Supreme Court
stated in 1869 that if "title to real property of any character may be conveyed by
writing not under seal, then all citizens, of every race and color, may convey
property of that character in the same mode."47 California's acceptance of this
method did not compel any other state to allow similar conveyances. The
California rule was tenable under national law because it was a reasonable
regulation of a congressionally enforceable right of U.S. citizenship. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment thus maintained a concur-

rence in national and state authority over civil rights.

Even though fundamental rights of citizens were nationalized, property law,

contract law, and tort law, among others, remained under state jurisdiction, as did
criminal law. The deliberate perpetuation of the traditional role of the states in

securing civil rights, under national scrutiny, is understandable in light of the
realities that confronted Congress in 1866. Despite the vast increase in the power
legislature to prescribe in what manner the rights of person and property shall be secured. A distinction
is to be taken here which the President's Veto message overlooks. Congress does not in this bill say by
what rules evidence shall be given in courts, by what tenure property shall be held, or how a citizen
shall be protected in his occupation. It only says to the states, whatever laws you pass in regard to these

matters, make them general; make them for the benefit of one race as well as for another." Clipping
in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, p. 32.
46 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,794 (C.C. Ky. 1867) (no. 16,151). By 1869, the states generally
recognized the right of blacks to testify as a congressionally secured right of citizenship. Ex parte Warren,
31 Tex. 147 (1868); Kelley v. Arkansas, 25 Ark. 392 (1869); State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); State
v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98 (1869).
47 State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 666-67 (1869).
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of the national government and the heightened sense of nationalism generated by
the Civil War, the states were still better suited to be the guardians of civil rights.
The national government simply did not have the resources to take on this new

function without the assistance of state governments. Nor was it necessary, let alone
desirable, for the national government to supplant state civil and criminal codes,
courts, and enforcement agencies, or to handle ordinary crimes and civil suits.48
Another point of debate over the framers' concept of a congressional civil rights
enforcement authority concerns whether the framers merely intended to secure

a racial equality in state law or whether they intended to protect rights directly. I
have argued that the framers believed Congress possessed the authority to enforce
civil rights directly and to redress any violations of civil rights. Whether or not
Congress chose to exercise this authority to its full extent, however, is another
question. The framers' understanding of the full scope of congressional authority
to enforce civil rights is a separate question from that of the scope of authority the
framers exercised to enforce civil rights in 1866. Whatever the framers' intent, they

permitted the statute and the amendment to go forward with the revolutionary
potential that a broad reading entailed.
Federal legal officers and judges certainly interpreted and applied the statute
to secure more than racially impartial state law. The Civil Rights Act authorized
these law enforcement officers to directly redress civil and criminal violations of
civil rights. Sections 1 and 3, as they were applied by federal officers, created a
private civil cause of action for the infringement of the rights that the Civil Rights

Act secured.49 Section 2 created a misdemeanor punishable in the federal courts
whenever a person, acting under pretext of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, violated the civil rights secured by Section 1.5 Section 3 authorized the
federal courts to supplant state and local courts and to sit as courts of primary civil
and criminal jurisdiction in specified circumstances. It provided for the removal

to the federal district and circuit courts of "all causes, civil and criminal, affecting
persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts orjudicial tribunals of the
state or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first
section." If local law enforcement officers failed to arrest and hold for trial alleged

criminals, the military and federal marshals were authorized to do so; if the state

court then failed to try the defendants, they were to be tried in the federal court.5'

48 Nevertheless, the creation of the Department of Justice and the reorganization of the office of
Attorney General in 1870 was a congressional recognition of the expanded jurisdiction and increased
legal business of the national government. This reorganization was an attempt by Congress to increase
efficiency in the handling of the nation's burgeoning legal affairs. However, Harold Hyman has noted
an anti-bureaucratic bias in this period that sharply curtailed the effectiveness of governmental action
in meeting the needs of Americans. Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 79; Hyman, A More
Perfect Union, chaps. 17-22, 25.
49 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C. Md. 1867) (no. 14,247); Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial
Interpretation, 27-48.

50 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 refers to citizens and specifies some of the rights that
citizens are to enjoy; Section 2 specifies certain infringements of these rights regardless of whether or
not the victim is a citizen. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
51 Federal legal officers-U.S. attorneys, marshals, and Freedmen's Bureau agents-and federal
judges interpreted the Civil Rights Act in this way. They were instrumental in prosecuting crimes
committed by whites against blacks when, immediately after the Civil War, local law enforcement
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Section 3 also authorized removal in situations in which a state defendant, civil or
criminal, could not receive impartial justice. In each of these instances, federal

agencies and officers exercised primary jurisdiction and administered justice as if
they were state and local agencies and officers.

OTHER ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT were taken directly
from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which had been adopted to implement the
fugitive slave clause of the Constitution.52 The statute authorized, even required,

federal judges and law officers to return runaway slaves to their owners. The
Supreme Court had interpreted the fugitive slave clause as conferring on slaveowners an unqualified right of property in their slaves, a right that delegated to
"the national government . .. appropriate authority and functions to enforce it"
through national legislative, judicial, and executive agencies independent of the

states.53 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 secured a fundamental right of U.S.
citizenship and formed a model for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The framers
recognized the irony of using a statute adopted to assure the rights of slaveowners
as the model for legislation to secure the rights of their former slaves. Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois approved this connection when he admonished the

Congress: "Surely we have the authority to enact a law as efficient in the interests
of freedom, now that freedom prevails throughout the country, as we had in the
interest of slavery when it prevailed in a portion of the country."54 The Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 served the cause of civil rights in 1866 in two ways. It provided

a blueprint for the direct enforcement of constitutional rights in national courts

by national legal agencies. It also provided a precedent for congressional legislation enacted to enforce rights over which the states had previously exercised
jurisdiction.

Some supporters of the bill explicitly expressed their intention to delegate to the
federal courts the primary jurisdiction over civil rights. When Wilson introduced

the Civil Rights Bill in the House, he declared that U.S. citizens were entitled to
the great fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property that free governments
are obliged to secure, and that, because the states refused to protect these rights
for some citizens, "we must do our duty by supplying the protection which the
states deny." The Republican senator from Indiana, Henry S. Lane, expressed the
same understanding in the Senate and declared: "Neither thejudge, nor thejury,
nor the officer as we believe is willing to execute the law . .. We should not legislate

at all if we believed the State courts could or would honestly carry out the provisions

of the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment; but because we believe they will not
agencies would not. See Kaczorowski, Politics ofJudicialInterpretation, 8-12, 27-48. The Supreme Court
subsequently interpreted Section 3 narrowly in a technical ruling that eliminated the criminal
jurisdiction over these crimes (pp. 135-43). The Supreme Court's decision is cited in Blyew and Kennard
v. United States, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 581 (1872).
52 27 Stat. 14, sects. 4-9 (1866); 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
53 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 539, 615, 623 (1842).

54 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
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do that, we give the Federal officers jurisdiction."55 When the congressional
proponents of civil rights enforcement stated that civil rights were to be secured

within the states, and when congressional opponents complained that Congress
was changing the relationship between citizens and the state governments, both
groups were referring to this assumption of state police powers by federal officers

and agencies. Federal legal officers and law enforcement agencies performed state
police functions and administered civil and criminal justice when local law
enforcement agents and agencies would not.56

Congress enacted this statute to enforce civil rights because the Republican
majority believed that Congress possessed primary authority over the civil rights
of American citizens. Congress would neither have conferred thejurisdiction it did
on federal agencies and officers nor legislated to secure civil rights two years prior
to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, if a majority of members had
believed that these powers were constitutionally reserved to the states, as the

Supreme Court declared in 1873 and 1876.57 The decision by Congress to confer
on federal courts the jurisdiction to try criminal offenses and civil disputes
supports the view that the framers believed that the Thirteenth Amendment
delegated to Congress primary authority over civil rights.

The framers' interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a general
guarantee of the natural rights of free people led to their inclusion of white
Americans within the protective guarantees of the Civil Rights Act. The framers
were explicit in expressing their intention to secure the civil rights of all Americans.

Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Bill "applies to white men as well as
black men. It declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the

same civil rights."58 A few years later, to combat the Ku Klux Klan, many of these

samne senators and representatives adopted additional legislation that defined as
federal crimes certain civil rights violations and conspiracies to violate civil rights

without requiring racial prejudice as an element of the offense. Also, U.S. attorneys
did not charge defendants with racial discrimination to bring violations of civil
rights within federal jurisdiction under these statutes. The gist of the offense was

the intention to deprive U.S. citizens of their rights.59

55 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1118 (Cong. Wilson); pp. 602-03 (Sen. Lane
56 See Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 27-48, 52-53, 79-115.
57 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542
(1876).

58 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 599. See also p.474 (Sen. Trumbull); pp. 504-05
(Sen. Johnson); p. 595 (Sen. Davis); p. 603 (Sen. Cowan); p. 3035 (Sen. Henderson); pp. 1066-67
(Cong. Price); p. 1 17 (Cong. Wilson); pp. I 120-21 (Cong. Rogers); pp. 1263, 1265 (Cong. Broomall);
p. 1264 (Spencer Colfax); pp. 1291, 2542 (Cong. Bingham); p. 1853 (Cong. Lawrence). See newspaper
clippings on the topic in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
Congress, pp. 4, 26, 32, 37, 47, 53, 58, 62, 78, 79, 132; clippings in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth
Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, pp. 17, 29, 31, 41, 53, 63, 82.

59 16 Stat. 140 (1870); 17 Stat. 13 (1871). U.S. DistrictJudge Richard Busteed to Attorney General
Amos T. Akerman, 22 November 1871, Source Chronological File, Northern District of Alabama,
Department ofJustice Records, National Archives; Charge to GrandJury, enclosed in above letter; U.S.
Attorney E. P. Jacobson to Amos Akerman, 4 and 7 August 1871, Source Chronological File, Southern
District of Mississippi, Department ofJustice, National Archives;Jacobson to Attorney General George
Williams, 17 February 1872, ibid.; U.S. Attorney G. Wiley Wells to George Williams, 5 March and 2
April 1872, Source Chronological File, Northern District of Mississippi, Department of Justice,
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The recognition of Congress as having the primary constitutional authority over
the personal security and civil rights of American citizens presented the danger
that the national government would supplant state and local governments in their
ordinary police functions. In 1866, opponents of the Civil Rights Bill loudly
protested that this was precisely the bill's effect.60 The framers confronted this

difficult problem of preserving federalism when they attempted to make civil
rights violations federal crimes punishable in the federal courts. The framers

attempted to distinguish federal crimes from ordinary crimes by limiting federal
criminal violations of civil rights to acts committed "under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom." Wilson explained that Congress was "not

making a general criminal code for the states."6' On the contrary, the supporters
wished to preserve the state administration of ordinary criminal justice. Although

the framers of the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871 expressed the same desire,
under these statutes, officers of the Department of Justice and federal judges in
some areas of the Southern states did replace local authorities who were

overwhelmed by the Klan and administered criminal justice for them.62

The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also limited its scope because they
intended to match federal sanctions to the specific violations of civil rights that

required national intervention, just as the framers of the 1870 and 1871 statutes
specified other kinds of offenses that confronted them. In other words, they
shaped federal criminal sanctions to provide effective civil rights protection where
and when it was needed. Black victims of racially motivated civil rights violations

who were unable to redress their grievances within the state criminaljustice system

had the greatest need for federal protection in 1866; consequently, the Act mnade
civil rights violations that were motivated by discriminatory intent federal crimes.
Senator Trumbull explained that the words, "'under color of law' were inserted
as words of limitation . . . If an offense is committed against a colored person

simply because he is colored, in a state where the law affords the same protection
as if he were white, this act neither has nor was intended to have anything to do
with his case, because he has adequate protection in the State Courts; but if he is

discriminated against under color of State law because he is colored, then it becomes
necessary to interfere for his protection."63 Discriminatory intent conceivably included
political prejudice, since white Unionists were also to be protected. Because state

National Archives; U.S. District Judge Robert A. Hill to Solicitor General Benjamin Bristow, 13 May
1872, Benjamin H. Bristow Papers, Library of Congress; Joint Select Committee on the Condition of
Affairs in the late Insurrectionary States, Report, 42nd Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 41 (1871), vol. 12, pp.
934-87. I discuss this subject in Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1 17-34.
60 Sen. Willard Saulsbury of Delaware warned that the Civil Rights Bill "positively deprives the State
of its police power of government." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 478. Sen. Davis
identified specific areas of state jurisdiction that Democrats feared would be supplanted by the Civil
Rights Bill when he espoused the state sovereignty theory of federalism and exclusive state authority
over civil rights. See p. 596.

61 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1120.
62 This history is recounted in Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 50-134.

63 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1758, emphasis added. Sen. Trumbu

comments were made in rebuttal to Pres. Johnson's objection that the Civil Rights Act would deprive
state courts of all cases affecting persons who were discriminated against, not simply those cases
involving a discrimination. See Pres. Johnson's veto message on p. 1680.
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laws and courts could be relied on to provide adequate remedies for ordinary
violations of the rights to life, liberty, and property, Section 2 of the Civil Rights
Act constituted an additional sanction for these violations when they were
committed under a discriminatory law or custom. As Senator Trumbull described
it, the framers believed a federal sanction was required because victims would be
unable to secure their rights when the violations stemmed from discriminatory
laws or community prejudices.

The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment

did not intend federal jurisdiction over civil rights to be limited to racially
discriminatory state action, as the Supreme Court later held in Slaughterhouse and
Cruikshank. Federal agents who removed cases from local authorities under Section
3 assumed their powers were broad. Judge Adjutant General of the Army, Joseph
Holt, for instance, interpreted the statute as authorization for removal in a case
in which a former Freedman's Bureau agent claimed that he was being harrassed
with a false prosecution in a Louisiana court because of the official assistance he
had given to blacks. When the statejudge, Edmund Abell, refused to allow the case
to be removed to the federal district court, federal officers arrested him and
charged him with violating the Civil Rights Act.64 In another case, the U.S. Circuit

Court held that white butchers in New Orleans had a claim against a slaughterhouse corporation chartered by the state, which the butchers alleged had
interfered with rights they enjoyed under the Civil Rights Act, namely, the rights
to labor, enter into contracts, and to equal benefit of the law for protection of
person and property.65

THE FRAMERS NEVER QUESTIONED THE AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS to confer jurisdic-

tion on the federal courts to try and punish civil rights violators. Congress
possessed this authority, they believed, because civil rights were nationally
enforceable rights of U.S. citizenship, under the Thirteenth Amendment and

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act.66 Hence, Congress possessed the authority to
prescribe criminal sanctions to secure these rights. The critical issue was whether
or not Congress possessed the authority to secure civil rights at all, not whether
Congress possessed the authority to provide criminal sanctions for persons who

violated its statutes. Congress spent little time discussing whether it could punish
private individuals who violated the Civil Rights Bill. If one conceded that
Congress possessed the authority to secure civil rights, it was too obvious for

discussion that it also possessed authority to punish violators of its statutes that
secured civil rights. The issue the framers found troublesome in this regard was
the propriety of authorizing the federal courts to punish state officers who violated

civil rights when they acted under the authority of state laws. Punishing state

64 Kaczorowski, Politics ofJudicial Interpretation, 34, 45, n. 16.
65 Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F. Cas. 655; reversed on other grounds, Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83
U.S.) 36. See also United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79.

66 The framers generally believed that the authority to secure civil rights of citizens "belongs t
sovereign power, and is essentially a subject of national jurisdiction." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st sess., 1866, p. 1090 (Cong. Bingham).
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officers acting in their official capacities represented a serious breach of federal
comity. Confrontations between national and state authority, always sensitive
matters, were especially so following the Civil War.

Opponents of the Civil Rights Act questioned the legality of prosecuting state
officials for actions that were committed under the sanction of state law.67 Debate
focused on the punishment of state judges who applied racially discriminatory
state statutes instead of declaring them unconstitutional. Opponents pointed out

the injustice of a public policy that sought to punish a state judge who, believing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be unconstitutional, enforced a state statute he
believed to be lawful. The criminal prosecution and punishment of state officials
was far more controversial than that of ordinary citizens because it involved a direct
confrontation between national and state authority. Troubled by this apparent
breach in federalism, proponents of the Civil Rights Act nevertheless insisted on

the need to punish anyone who violated nationally enforceable civil rights and
flouted the statutes Congress enacted to secure them, even if that person were a

judge. Senator Trumbull was adamant: "The right to punish individuals who

violate the laws of the United States cannot be questioned, and the fact that in doin
so they acted under color of law or usage in any locality affords no protection;
because by the Constitution that instrument and the laws passed in pursuance
thereof are the supreme law of the land, and every judge, not only of the United
States, but of every State court is bound thereby."68

Even though the inclusion of public officials within the penal sections of the Act
was extraordinary, the framers insisted that prosecuting them for civil rights
offenses was imperative. Punishing political leaders for civil rights violations would
be far more effective in curbing these crimes than punishing ordinary citizens
would. Senator Trumbull elaborated: "When it comes to be understood in all parts
of the United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right or
subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose
himself to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will cease."69 The framers

hoped the public would realize that even those thought to be beyond prosecution
because they wielded governmental authority were subject to the Act's provisions.70

Whereas most of the discussion of Section 2 in Congress focused on statejudges
as the targets of the penal provisions of the Act, the debates suggest that this section
was not intended to apply only to public officials. When Senator Edgar Cowan of
Pennsylvania objected that these penal provisions singled out state officials for

criminal prosecution, Trumbull denied this. Cowan asked, "Is there not a
67 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., l st sess., 1866, pp.601-02 (Sen. Hendricks); p. 1783 (Sen.
Appendix 183 (Sen. Davis); pp. 1154-55 (Cong. Eldridge); p. 1265 (Cong. Davis); p. 1267 (Cong.
Raymond); and p. 1271 (Cong. Kerr).

68 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759.
69 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
70 The Department of Justice and the federal courts in some Southern states engaged in
effort to bring Ku Klux Klansmen to justice for terrorizing Southern blacks and their white Unionist
allies. The government's policy was to select the most prominent defendants for prosecution.
Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 79-99.
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provision by which State officials are to be punished?" Trumbull replied, "Not State

officials especially, but everyone who violates the law. It is the intention to punish
everybody who violates the law."'7' Trumbull repeated this construction in urging
the Senate to enact the Civil Rights Act over President Johnson's veto.72 Although

the language of Section 2 can support a reading that limits its application to state
officers, such a reading contradicts Senator Trumbull's explicit interpretation of
its scope. In light of the framers' concept of a congressional authority to enforce
civil rights that permitted Congress to punish any individual who violated the

statute, not to accept the position of Senator Trumbull, the author and Senate floor
manager, would be illogical and contradictory to the record, especially when
virtually no one in Congress disagreed with him. That federal legal officers and
judges interpreted the statute consistent with Senator Trumbull's position makes
this conclusion even stronger.73 It appears, then, that the framers of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866 did not intend to apply the criminal penalties of Section 2 only
to state officers. Their comments evince their intention to punish even state officials
who violated the civil rights of American citizens.

Congressional supporters and opponents of the Civil Rights Act expressed the
same concerns and intentions in discussing the statute's third section. This section

authorizes removal of a case from the state courts when the parties seeking removal
cannot enforce their civil rights or the state's legal process is violating their civil
rights. Although the framers expected state agencies to handle ordinary civil and

criminal cases, they understood that local officials were failing to protect the rights
of many citizens and to administer civil and criminal justice in a racially and
politically impartial manner.74 To make the enforcement of nationally secured
rights effective, the framers gave the federal courts the primary civil and criminal

jurisdiction over civil rights when state agencies failed to secure them. It is crucial
to note that federal legal officers and judges understood that it was the inability

of the citizen to enforce a civil right in a state court, not the existence of racially
discriminatory state laws, that permitted the individual to remove the case to a

federal court.75 The statute's congressional supporters manifested the same
understanding.

The framers thus distinguished ordinary cases in which state agencies enforced
and protected the rights of citizens from cases in which the federal courts would
have to takejurisdiction because of state intransigence. A party could remove a case
to a federal court if the state court enforced discriminatory laws, Senator Trumbull

maintained, "or, if undertaking to enforce his right in a State court he was denied
that right, then he could go into a Federal court; but it by no means follows that
7' Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 500.

72 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1758.
73 Suits were brought against private proprietors of public facilities and public carriers who were
fined for excluding blacks from their facilities. See McPherson's and Underwood's Scrapbooks cited
in note 43.

74 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 602-03 (Sen. Lane of Indiana); pp. 600, 1760
(Sen. Trumbull); p. 1785 (Sen. Stewart); p. 2967 (Sen. Poland); p. 1119 (Cong. Wilson); p. 1293 (Cong.
Bingham); pp. 1293-94 (Cong. Shellabarger); pp. 1832-36 (Cong. Lawrence).

75 See Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 8-10.
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every person would have a right in thefirst
there was on the statute book of the State a law discriminating against him, the

presumption being- that the judge of the court, when he comes to act on the
would, in the obedience to the paramount law of the United States, hold the State

statute invalid."76 The authority to remove a case, then, was triggered when a
citizen alleged that the state court would not enforce a civil right.
Although the discriminatory action or inaction of the state might create a

situation in which federal enforcement of civil rights was necessary, this was not
the basis of federaljurisdiction. The third section of the Civil Rights Act conferred
jurisdiction on the federal courts when the citizen was unable to enforce a civil right
in the state courts. It was the citizen's lack of success that Senator Trumbull
emphasized. He distinguished between cases in which state laws discriminated but
the state court enforced the citizen's right anyway, and cases in which the laws did
not discriminate, but, for some other reason, such as the racial or political prejudice
of the judge or jury, the citizen was still unable to enforce the right in the state
courts. Senator Trumbull asserted that Congress had authority over both: "If it

be necessary in order to protect the freedman in his rights that he should have
authority to go into the Federal courts in all cases where a custom prevails in a State,
or where there is a Statute-law of the State discriminating against him, I think we

have the authority to confer that jurisdiction."77 Senator Trumbull was referring
to invidious treatment of blacks, but protection against politically discriminatory
customs was also essential to support white political allies in the South. If federal

law merely prohibited racially discriminatory state laws, white Unionists would not
have been afforded the protection under federal law the framers intended to
provide them.78

The framers did not believe that federal protection was required in all cases
involving discriminatory laws and customs. If they had, the Civil Rights Act would

have been made applicable whenever the laws and customs of a community or a
state discriminated. Senator Trumbull observed that a person was not necessarily
"discriminated against because there may be a custom in the community discriminating against him, nor because the legislature may have passed a statute

discriminating against him."79 The Civil Rights Act would have invalidated the law
76 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759, emphasis added.
7 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759. For a contrary view, see Fairman,
Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, 1238-44.

78 In addition to the obvious need to protect blacks and white Unionists from overt hostility, Sec
3 also addresses more subtle forms, such as that described by Southern Unionists who petitioned
congressional Republicans to conferjurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce their economic rights.
Unionist creditors who rejected Confederate money in payment of debts risked having those debts
cancelled by state statute and rendered unenforceable in state courts. They pleaded for access to the
federal courts to enforce these debts and other contracts that they believed political prejudice prevented
them from enforcing in the state courts. T. J. Gretlows to Lyman Trumbull, 8 and 19 January 1866,
Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; George A. Custer to Zachariah Chandler, 14 January 1866,
Zachariah Chandler Papers, Library of Congress. A concern for economic rights could explain the U.S.
Circuit Court's decision applying the Civil Rights Act to protect white butchers who claimed that their
civil rights under the Act were violated when the state conferred monopolistic privileges on a
slaughterhouse corporation. Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F. Cas. 655.
79 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759.
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or custom, and Trumbull presumed that a state court would so hold. Therefore,
however naively, Trumbull assumed that individuals might still be able to enforce
their rights in the state courts despite the presence of discriminatory laws and
customs.

The framers expressly distinguished between racially discriminatory laws and
the actions of individuals who violated civil rights and asserted their intention of
protecting against both. Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Act

conferred on the courts of the United States jurisdiction "over all persons
committing offenses against the provisions of this act, and also over the cases of
persons who are discriminated against by State laws or customs."80 Senator Lane
also understood the statute's scope to include the actions of individuals acting

under "the power of local prejudice to override the laws of the country."8' Both
senators expected the federal military to aid the federaljudicial process "whenever
there is a combination of persons in any of the rebellious states so powerful that
the marshals and civil officers in the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings cannot
execute the law."82 This concept of federal action presaged the Enforcement Act

of 1871 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which were directed at this kind of
lawlessness.

Civil rights were doubly secured under the first three sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. A private cause of action was created for black citizens unable to

exercise civil rights under the same conditions as white citizens, and anyone who
infringed a citizen's civil rights under pretext of law or custom was subject to
prosecution and punishment in the federal courts. In addition, the federal courts

were authorized to assume original jurisdiction of civil and criminal cases when
citizens were unable to enforce their rights in the state courts. Congress thus
applied national authority directly to private individuals as well as to public
officials. The framers asserted that Congress possessed this authority because they

assumed that civil rights were recognized by the Constitution as rights of U.S.
citizens.
Federal judges and legal officers interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as conferring a broad
authority to enforce civil rights directly, irrespective of the presence of discriminatory state action and regardless of the source of the violation, because these
rights were the natural rights that belonged to all free citizens of a free republic.
Indeed, the notion that a national civil rights enforcement authority was merely
a guarantee of racially impartial government action was not judicially recognized
in the federal courts until the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1870s.83
The Supreme Court's decisions narrowing enforcement authority reflected the

North's diminished interest in Reconstruction.84 By the 1870s, the Republican
80
81
82
83

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 603.
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 605.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36; United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 5

Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1-48, 117-97.
84 For a contrary view, see Michael Les Benedict, "Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the
Waite Court," Supreme Court Review (1978): 39.
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party, a coalition of diverse political groups, began to fragment further over the
policies and corruption of Ulysses S. Grant's presidency.85 One group split away
during Grant's first administration to form a separate party, the Liberal Republicans. They turned against Grant's Southern policy and resisted congressional
interference in the South. Liberal Republicans also fought to curtail the size and
power of the national government and to return political authority to local

government. Their objectives indicated their desire for a return to normality and
their interest in increasing states' rights for the purpose of controlling monopolies

and the railroads. Some of the leaders of civil rights enforcement joined this
movement. Lyman Trumbull was one. Reflecting these new political pressures, he

changed his views regarding a national authority to enforce civil rights. By 1871,
he was insisting that the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment
applied only to racially discriminatory state action, and that they guaranteed no

more than racial equality in state-conferred rights and a prohibition against racially

discriminatory state laws.86 By July of 1873, the Grant administration also lost
interest in Reconstruction and ended its policy of civil rights enforcement.87

Except for a few minor episodes of federal involvement in Southern affairs, black
and white Republicans in the South were left on their own. Insofar as the
enforcement of civil rights was concerned, Reconstruction ended long before the

Compromise of 1877.
As THE REPUBLICAN FRAMERS UNDERSTOOD THEM, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

Amendments were constitutionally revolutionary. These amendments delegated
to Congress the authority to render a radical change in the role of the national

government in American life. Congress and the federal courts had not participated
to any great extent before 1860 in guaranteeing the fundamental and personal
rights of citizens. Republicans chose to protect these rights in 1866 by enacting the

Civil Rights Act, which conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over and
responsibility for enforcing the personal rights of citizens directly when citizens
could not do so in the traditional institutions, namely, the state and local courts.
This new role for national institutions involved radical changes in constitutional

law. Fundamental rights were secured and enforced through state law before the
Civil War, but, afterwards, the civil rights statutes made fundamental rights a

matter of national jurisdiction. The fundamental rights of citizens were now
defined as rights pertaining to U.S. citizenship and, as such, were recognized by
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Although the states were expected

to continue in their traditional function of securing civil rights, their authority was
to be shared with Congress and the federal courts. Because federal law was

supreme, Congress and the federal courts could supplant all state authority over
personal rights. The framers' legal theory of citizenship and congressional

authority over the rights of citizens held the potential of ending federalism and
85 For an excellent political history of the period, see William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction,
1869-1879 (Baton Rouge, La., 1979).

86 Congressional Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st sess., 1871, pp. 575-76.
87 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 11 1.
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establishing a consolidated, unitary state. That the framers eschewed this extreme

institutional arrangement should not deflect attention from the other ways in

which civil rights amendments and laws of Reconstruction represented, to the
framers and federal legal officers, a revolutionary constitutionalism and a new
American federalism centered in national authority and national institutions.

In the 1870s, the Supreme Court rejected the revolutionary congressional
Republican theory of constitutionalism and read into the Thirteenth and Four-

teenth Amendments the theory of states' rights promoted by congressional
Conservative Democrats. The Court explicitly rejected the broader theory of a
congressional civil rights enforcement authority, precisely because it was revolutionary. The Supreme Court preserved a modified theory of state sovereignty,
resurrected a theory of American federalism based on states' rights, and

recognized primary authority over citizenship and civil rights as residing in the

states. Although American law denied the right of secession, it adopted other
important elements of the antebellum theory of constitutionalism. Congressional
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may have

thought they were reconstructing American government and basing it on a
revolutionary constitutional foundation, but the Supreme Court decided against
this revolutionary constitutionalism in a reactionary resurgence of states' rights
that resulted in the virtual reenslavement of Southern black Americans.
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